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Abstract
Spinoza posed the fundamental problem of politics as a question 
of desire: Why do humans fight for their servitude as if it were 
their salvation? Why does desire desire its own repression? Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari take up this question in Anti-Oedipus 
and attempt to provide a rigorous response. Whereas Plato 
defined desire in terms if lack (if I desire something, it is because 
I lack it), Kant effected a revolution in thought by defining desire 
in terms of production (because I desire something, I produce it). 
It is this productive concept of desire that allows Deleuze and 
Guattari to effect a synthesis between Freud (libidinal economy) 
and Marx (political economy), though as I argue Deleuze and 
Guattari’s deeper points of reference are Spinoza and Nietzsche. 
We conclude by analyzing Deleuze and Guattari’s relation to the 
question of a democratic politics.
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1. Immanence and the Problem of Desire
One of the fundamental questions of political philosophy was formu-
lated by Baruch Spinoza in the preface to his Theological-Political Treatise 
(1991 [1670]): Why do humans fight for their servitude as though it were 
their salvation?1 Put differently, this is a question of desire, or what is 
sometimes called “voluntary servitude”: How can desire desire its own 
repression? Why do slaves consent to their slavery, or the exploited to 
their exploitation? Spinoza poses the problem in the context of the Ro-
man principle dulce et decorum est pro patria mori (“It is a sweet and noble 
thing to die for one’s country”): Why do people consider it the highest 
honor to give their blood and their lives for the glory of their country—or 
even one man (the tyrant or despot)—or even for our collective “free-
dom”? In Anti-Oedipus, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari pose the prob-
lem in less militaristic terms: “What is astonishing is not that some peo-
ple steal or that others occasionally go out on strike,” they write, “but 
rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, 
and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983 [1972]: 29; see also 257, 356, 379). How and why, in 
other words, do we—all of us, you, me—invest ourselves in a social system 
that nonetheless exploits us, that separates us from what we can do, that 
makes us miserable?
In one sense, the answer to this question is obvious, and has already 
been given by Wilhelm Reich in his work on the problem of fascism. The 
masses supported Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, neither out of ignorance, nor 
because they were prey to an illusion, nor because they believed their “in-
terests” were best defended by such dictators. “No, the masses were not 
innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they 
desired fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that 
needs to be accounted for” (Ibid.). 
1 People “will fight for their servitude as if for salvation, and count it no shame, 
but the highest honor, to spend their blood and their lives for the glorification of one 
man” (Spinoza 1991 [1670]: 3).
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2. The Freud-Marx Synthesis
It is this problematic of desire that Deleuze attempts to address in 
Anti-Oedipus. Famously, Anti-Oedipus was often read as one of the first 
successful attempts to bring about a synthesis of Karl Marx and Sigmund 
Freud (the “masters of suspicion”), both of whom appealed to “uncon-
scious” determinations of the political sphere. In very general terms, for a 
Marxist, human discourses are determined by underlying relations of pro-
duction, and the explicit “ideology” of a discourse must be made apparent 
by relating it to production in such a way that its class interest becomes 
discernible. For a Freudian, conscious representations are symptomatic of 
unconscious desires, and the task of analysis is to cure the subject by 
making these unconscious mechanisms apparent. The whole problem was 
how to relate these two “unconscious” economies together—the political 
economy of Marx and the libidinal economy of Freud. Earlier attempts 
had turned to extrinsic notions such as introjection and projection: I in-
troject social determinations into my personal unconscious, and social 
determinations are themselves collective projections of our individual 
psyches. How such mechanisms worked, however, were difficult to ex-
plain.
Deleuze suggests that it was Pierre Klossowski, in his 1972 book Liv-
ing Currency, who found a way, through Friedrich Nietzsche, to solve the 
problem of the relation between Marx and Freud, between political econ-
omy (the social) and libidinal economy (the individual): “by discovering 
[…] how the affects or drives form part of the infrastructure itself” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983 [1972]: 63, own emphasis added).2 Deleuze and Guat-
tari take up this Nietzschean schema in Anti-Oedipus: what they call “de-
sire” is nothing other than the state of our impulses and drives. We desire 
what we desire because our drives and affects have been constituted or 
“machined” in that way. “The drives,” Deleuze tells us, “are simply the 
desiring-machines themselves,” they are the way in which desire in engi-
neered in sociopolitical terms (Deleuze and Guattari 1983 [1972]: 35). 
When Deleuze says that the drives are themselves economic, that they are 
already part of what Marx called the infrastructure, he is reiterating, in his 
2 See also Klossowski: “They themselves [the drives] create their own repres-
sion” (2017 [1970]: 48). Deleuze confirmed his indebtedness to Klossowski in a letter 
dated 21 April, 1971: “You introduce desire into the infra-structure or inversely, which 
amounts to the same thing, you introduce the category of production into desire: this 
seems to me of an immense importance; for it is the only means to get out of the sterile 
parallelism Marx–Freud, Money–Excrement … Once again, I’m following you.” Cited in 
Wilson (2006: 15).
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own manner, Nietzsche’s thesis that our drives are always assembled (or-
dered and ranked) by morality.
It is this theme that I would like to explore briefly in this paper: the 
political problem of desire (How can desire desire its own repression? 
How can the exploited desire their own exploitation?) at a level where our 
own affects and drives are seen to be determined in a direct political man-
ner (they are part of the infrastructure), rather than being seen as some 
sort of instinctual or “natural” substratum of our being that somehow has 
to be “sublimated” or “projected” outward in order to enter into the do-
main of the political.
 
3. Desire and the Problem of Immanence
Posing the problem of desire in this way is what Deleuze calls an im-
manent conception of desire, and it entails, indeed, something of a revolu-
tion in the traditional conception of desire (at least in the philosophical 
tradition). What exactly does it mean to speak of an immanent conception 
of desire? The fact is that philosophy has almost always linked desire to a 
field of transcendence, from Plato and the Greeks, through Augustine and 
Christianity, to Hegel and Freud: if you desire something, it is because you 
lack that something. If desire exists, it is the sign, it is the very fact, that 
lack exists. Desire is the desire for what one does not have; it is therefore 
defined as the function of a field of transcendence (since what one does 
not have transcends my field of immanence). 
In this vision of transcendence, desire necessarily oscillates between 
two poles. The negative pole signifies the fundamental absence of the de-
sired object (which, in Plato, is the Good): whereas need is a relative lack 
that is satisfied as soon as the object is attained, desire is an irremediable 
ontological lack that is unrealizable (a lack of Being). This is the tragic 
vision of desire: humans are incomplete and riddled with deficiencies, 
and desire is the sign of this incompleteness, the mark of their tragic mis-
ery. The ultimate object of desire is always missing, it is never in its place, 
it is never found, it is always transcendent. 
But there is also a positive pole to this desire: conscious of this lack, 
humanity seeks to acquire its Being by making its desire coincide with the 
order of the Good that desire itself furthers. This is the dramatic dimen-
sion of desire, the theme of the quest, the incessant search of the restless 
soul (Augustine). Plato’s initial postulate of the lack of Being is thus preg-
nant with a series of intermediate postulates that lead to the ultimate 
postulate of a recovered Being. But since desire, left to itself, cannot direct 
Being toward its realization, the Republic will indicate the conditions (cul-
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ture, knowledge) capable of making desire coincide with the essence it 
lacks.3
Summarizing this tradition of transcendence, Clement Rosset has 
written: every time desire is defined by lack, “the world acquires as its 
double some other sort of world, in accordance with the following line of 
argument: there is an object that desire feels the lack of; hence the world 
does not contain each and every object that exists; there is at least one 
object missing, the one that desire feels the lack of; hence there exists 
some other place that contains the key to desire (missing in this world)” 
(Rosset 1970: 37). What then would it mean to think of desire in purely 
immanent terms? We are so used to this transcendent conception of de-
sire—if we desire, it is because we lack something—that it is difficult to 
conceive of an alternative, or even to conceptualize what an immanent 
formula of desire would look like.
4. Kant’s Copernican Revolution in Practical Philoso-
phy
Now oddly enough, it was Immanuel Kant who brought about this 
revolution in the theory of desire. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant 
offers a definition of desire that breaks entirely with the previous tradi-
tion. Desire, he says, is “a faculty which, by means of its representations, 
is the cause of the actuality of the objects of those representations” (Kant 
1957 [1790]: III, n1). This is a remarkable definition of desire, since it sees 
desire as something productive. This is indeed Kant’s Copernican Revolu-
tion in practical philosophy: desire is no longer defined in terms of lack (I 
desire something because I do not have it) but rather in terms of produc-
tion (I produce something because I desire it). But what exactly is Kant 
saying here? At a first view, Kant’s definition of desire as productive seems 
somewhat untenable and even magical: I have a representation, and de-
sire is the faculty that is capable of bringing about the reality of its object. 
The more one reads in Kant, the more insistent Kant becomes with this 
definition: “Practical reason,” he says elsewhere, “is concerned not with 
objects in order to know them, but with its own capacity to make them 
real” (Kant 1993 [1788]: 93, “Elucidation of the Analytic”). What does 
Kant mean here?
Kant is in fact making two points about practical and political phi-
losophy. On the one hand, Kant defines desire in the way he does because 
the problem of freedom concerns the operation by which a free being can 
be said to be the cause of an action: in acting freely, the agent produces 
3 Plato (1925: 206a, 205e). This analysis of the transcendent concept of desire 
is indebted to Dominique Grisoni (1982: 169–82).
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something that is not reducible to the causal determinism of the mecha-
nistic world. In that sense, desire indeed seems to be capable of bringing 
about the reality of its representations: I want to steal your car, and desire 
is the faculty capable of bringing about the reality of that action. This is 
why Kant says that practical reason “has to do with a will which is a caus-
al agent so far as reason contains its determining ground” (Kant 1993 
[1788]: 93 “Elucidation of the Analytic”). On the other hand, Kant knows 
fully well that a “real” object can only be produced through an external 
causality and external mechanisms. For Kant, the reality of the object 
produced by desire is, in the end, merely a psychic reality. Desire may in-
deed be productive, but what it produces “in reality” are mere fantasies: 
psychic realities such as hallucinations, deliriums, superstitions, imagi-
nary objects, and so on. Thus, despite the Copernican revolution, the Kan-
tian conception of desire still remains tied to the transcendent concep-
tion of desire: if desire lacks a real object, then its own reality still tied to 
an “essence of lack,” and it is this lack that produces the fantasized object. 
Freudian psychoanalysis, of course, would provide a plausible explanation 
of desire as the production of fantasies.4
Now I would argue that one of the primary aims of Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s book Anti-Oedipus is to draw out the full implications of Kant’s def-
inition of desire as productive. “If desire produces,” Deleuze writes, “its 
product is real [and not merely a fantasy]. If desire is productive, it can be 
productive only in the real world and can produce only reality” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1983 [1972]: 26). The critical reversal brought about by Anti-
Oedipus is to view the process of desire as itself a “material economic real-
ity,” and not merely a psychic reality.5 In other words, political economy 
(Marx) and libidinal economy (Freud) are one and the same thing. For De-
leuze, this is what it means to speak of a purely immanent conception of 
4 For Freud, the unconscious is incapable of reproducing (or rediscovering) 
primary (childhood) situations where the drives could obtain complete satisfaction; 
failing to realize its desire (repression), the unconscious produces an imaginary object 
that functions as a compensatory double of reality, a mental production functioning 
alongside real production that “suspends” desire, thanks to the compensatory situa-
tions (sublimation) constitutive of civilization. “This means that the real object that 
desire lacks is related to an extrinsic natural or social production, whereas desire in-
trinsically produces an imaginary object that comes to double reality, as if there were ‘a 
dreamed object behind every real object,’ or a mental production or real productions” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 25–26). Like Plato, Freud still finds the true cause of desire 
in a primal lack, and divides it into a positive pole (Eros, the desire for life and repro-
duction) that passes into the real, invests the social field, and supports the effects of 
moralization and culture (sublimation); and a negative pole (Thanatos, the desire for 
death and destruction) that takes cover in the unconscious and undertakes the patient 
weaving of the fantastic signs of its gratification.
5 “There is no particular form of existence that could be called ‘psychic reali-
ty’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 25).
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desire: desire is primary, it is an active power that is not derived from a 
lack of an absent object; it is not bivalent, having a positive and negative 
pole, but is purely positive; and finally, desire is not produced (because of 
a lack), it is productive, the desired thing is not desired because it is ab-
sent, but on the contrary it is real because desired. But how does Deleuze 
justify this extraordinary claim that desire produces the real?
5. Deleuze’s Inversion of Kant
For Kant, the essential question concerns the higher form that each 
faculty is capable of (a form which is no longer merely “pathological”). A 
faculty has a higher form when it finds within itself the law of its own ex-
ercise (and thus functions autonomously). The higher form of desire, for 
Kant, is what he calls the “will.” The will is the same thing as desire but 
raised to its higher form. Desire becomes will when it is determined by the 
representation of a pure form, namely, the moral law, which is the pure 
form of a universal legislation, that is, the categorical imperative. Practi-
cal reason concerns the will, which has reason as its determining ground—
under such conditions we are acting freely. But significantly, in order to 
function, the moral law requires the intervention of the three great tran-
scendent Ideas as its postulates. Freedom, as the “fact” of morality, im-
plies the cosmological Idea of a supra-sensible world, independent of any 
sensible condition; in turn, the abyss that separates the noumenal Law 
and the phenomenal world requires the intermediary of an intelligible 
author of sensible Nature or a “moral cause of the world” (the theological 
Idea of a supreme being, or God)—an abyss that can only be bridged 
through the “postulate” of an infinite progress, which requires the psycho-
logical Idea of the immortality of the soul. In other words, having de-
nounced the transcendent Ideas of Soul, World, and God in the first Cri-
tique, Kant resurrects each of them, one by one, in the second Critique, 
and gives them a practical determination.
Anti-Oedipus remains an incomprehensible book as long as one does 
not see its overall structure as an attempt, on Deleuze’s part, to rewrite 
the Critique of Practical Reason from the viewpoint of a strictly immanent 
theory of Ideas. What would a purely immanent theory of desire look like? 
What if one did not appeal to the moral law and the transcendent Ideas 
that serve as its postulates, and which instead synthesized desire with a 
conception of Ideas as purely immanent? This is precisely what Deleuze 
does in the opening two chapters of Anti-Oedipus: the three syntheses by 
which he and Guattari define “desiring-machines” are in fact the three 
same Ideas that Kant defines as the postulates of practical reason—Self, 
World, and God—but now stripped entirely of their transcendent status, 
to the point where neither God, World, nor Self subsist. As Deleuze had 
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already put the point in Logic of Sense: “The divergence of the affirmed 
series forms a ‘chaosmos’ and no longer a World; the aleatory point which 
traverses them forms a counter-self, and no longer a self; disjunction pos-
es as a synthesis exchanges its theological principle of diabolic principle 
[…] The Grand Canyon of the world, the ‘crack’ of the self, and the dis-
membering of God” (Deleuze 1990 [1969]: 176). In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze 
gives a purely immanent characterization of the three syntheses—con-
nection (Self), conjunction (World), and disjunction (God)—and then 
shows how desire itself is constituted by tracing out series and trajecto-
ries following these syntheses within a given social assemblage.
Now to flesh out this idea of an immanent conception of desire, I 
would like to turn briefly to the two thinkers that are its most important 
precursors—not Marx and Freud, but rather Spinoza and Nietzsche, whom 
Deleuze has always taken to be his primary philosophical inspirations. 
Spinoza and Nietzsche are the two great exemplars of immanence in phi-
losophy. In our context here, this means that they were the two thinkers 
to put forward the idea that our affects and drives are directly political—in 
other words, that the libidinal economy and political economy are one 
and the same thing. Let me just say, then, a brief word about each of them 
before returning, finally, to the way Deleuze brings this to bear on his 
problematic of desire.
6. Spinoza and the Affects 
Spinoza, for his part, drew a famous distinction between “affections” 
(affectio) and “affects” (affectus). Consider someone in the midst of their 
everyday life: I walk down a city street on a Sunday afternoon; I greet one 
or two acquaintances I pass on the way; I sit in a park in the warmth of the 
afternoon sun, reading a book; in the evening, I meet a friend in a café for 
a coffee and a sandwich; afterwards, I feel slightly ill and head home. Spi-
noza suggests that we can make a “geometrical” analysis of our everyday 
life along these two axes of affections and affects. On the one hand, an 
“affection” indicates the state of my body insofar as it is affected by an-
other body, which is determined in the mind as a succession of ideas. 
While walking down the street, I see Peter, and then Paul—a succession of 
ideas. Later, while sitting in a park, I see the sun, and then the sun sets and 
it becomes dark—another succession of ideas or affections. 
On the other hand, each of these affections also determines what 
Spinoza will call an “affect.” I see Peter, but we’ve had a falling out, and I 
feel uneasy seeing him, so I veer away and avoid him. Then I see Paul, an 
old friend who is charming and amiable; I walk up to him and greet him, 
feeling reassured and content. There is still a succession of ideas here—
the idea of Peter and the idea of Paul—but there is also something else: a 
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variation in what Spinoza calls my “force of existing” (vis existendi) or 
“power of acting” (potentia agendi) (1966 [1677]).
When I see Peter, my power of acting decreases; when I see Paul, it 
increases. The heat of the sun in the park increases my power of acting, 
the sunburn I develop decreases it. Food increases my force of existing, 
but my stomach ache later decreases it. Here, we are no longer in the do-
main of the external affection on my body (or the idea in my mind), but 
rather in the domain of the affects: our power of acting or force of exis-
tence is increased or diminished in a continuous manner, on a continuous 
line, depending on my external affections (that is, the way other bodies 
affect me). The affects define a regime of continuous variation that is con-
stantly rising and falling—joy is a rising affect, sadness a falling affect—
and which marks a lived transition or lived passage from what Spinoza 
calls one “degree of perfection” to another (Spinoza 1996, 31–32). Indeed, 
this language of rises and falls in affective intensity is Spinoza’s anticipa-
tory language of mania and depression—what is today called “bipolarity”.
This is why Spinoza, like Gottfried Leibniz, liked to speak of the soul 
as a spiritual automaton, since nine-tenths of what we do we do automati-
cally.6 As spiritual automata, there are in us ideas and affections that suc-
ceed one another (affections or affectio), while at the same time, our 
“power of acting” or “force of existence” is increased or diminished in a 
continuous manner, on a continuous line (affects or affectus). Spinoza no 
doubt admits an instance of what we like to call “agency”—for him, the 
ethical task is to reach the point where we can be the source of our own 
affections and affects, a kind of auto-affectivity—but the givenness of our 
existence places us in a position in which we are primarily a multiplicity of 
affections and affects. This is obviously why a neurobiologist such as An-
tonio Damasio can find in Spinoza such a kindred spirit in Looking for 
Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Damasio 2003), and why Wil-
liam Conolly, in Neuropolitics, was able to show in a profound manner the 
direct link between the political and the neurological dimension of affects 
and affections (Connolly 2002). Lars Tønder’s exploration of the political 
import of the affect of hilaritas, as described by Spinoza is, in my opinion, 
a profound development of this idea of the direct political import of the 
affects (Tønder 2005). (I might note in passing that, in film, it was the 
great French director Robert Bresson who most profoundly explored the 
idea of the “spiritual automaton” in the cinema, preferring to use in his 
films, not actors, but what he called “models” or “Vigilambulists,” som-
nambulists in the waking state.)
6 “So far as I know they [the ancients] never conceived the soul (as we do here) 
as acting according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton” (Spinoza 1985 [1677]: 
37). Leibniz, for his own reasons, would appeal to the same image: “The soul is a most 
exact spiritual automaton” (Leibniz 1969: 495).
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7. Nietzsche and the Drives
The thinker who most directly took up and developed Spinoza’s the-
ory of affectivity, albeit in a highly independent manner, was Nietzsche. 
When Nietzsche famously proposed to use the body (rather than the 
mind) as a model for philosophy, he understood this not only in the sense 
of the extensive body (the organism), but more importantly, in terms of 
the intensive body (or what Deleuze, following Antonin Artaud, would call 
the “body without organs”). The intensive body is the locus of a system of 
drives: every individual contains within itself “a vast confusion of contra-
dictory drives” (Nietzsche 1967 [1901]: §259), and as such must be under-
stood as a multiplicity and not an identity. This is the source of Nietzsche’s 
doctrine of perspectivism (“there are no facts, only interpretations”)—but 
it is our drives that interpret the world and are perspectival, and not our 
egos or our conscious opinions. The point is not that I have a different 
perspective on the world than others, but that each of us has multiple 
perspectives on the world within ourselves because of the multiplicity of 
our drives—drives that are contradictory among themselves, and in a con-
stant struggle or combat with each other. “Within ourselves,” Nietzsche 
writes, “we can be egoistic or altruistic, hard-hearted, magnanimous, just, 
lenient, insincere, can cause pain or give pleasure” (quoted in Parkes 
1996: 291–92, own emphasis added). Nietzsche developed his parallel 
concept of the will to power at the level of the drive: “Every drive is a kind 
of lust to rule, each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all 
the other drives to accept as a norm” (Nietzsche 196: §481).
If Nietzsche considered the ego or the “I” to be a kind of fiction, it is 
because, when we think “we” are fighting a drive, or combating our pas-
sions, it is in fact one drive that is combating another drive (Nietzsche 1997 
[1881]: §109). The ego (or intellect) simply takes sides in this combat of 
the drives: when we talk about the “I,” we are simply indicating which 
drive, at the moment, is strongest and sovereign. Thus, what do I mean 
when I say “I am trying to stop smoking”—even though that same I is 
constantly going ahead and continuing to smoke? It simply means that 
my conscious intellect is taking sides and associating itself with a particu-
lar drive. It would make just as much sense to say, “Occasionally I feel this 
strange urge to stop smoking, but happily I’ve managed to combat that 
drive and pick up a cigarette whenever I want.” Here again, there is an 
automatism at work: instinctively, Nietzsche says, we tend to take our 
predominant drive and for the moment turn it into the whole of our ego, 
placing all our weaker drives perspectivally farther away, as if those other 
drives weren’t me but rather something else, something other inside me, 
a kind of “it” (hence Freud’s idea of the “id,” the “it”—it is clear he derived 
this idea from Nietzsche) (Nietzsche 1966 [1886]: §19). When we talk 
about the “I,” we are simply indicating which drive, at the moment, is 
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sovereign, strongest; the feeling of the I is always strongest where the 
preponderance [Übergewicht] is, flickering from drive to drive.
But the drives themselves remain largely unknown to the conscious 
intellect, and one can see where this renders the link between affectivity 
and politics somewhat problematic. The liberal tradition of political phi-
losophy, at least, tends to focus on the individual, and moreover, the indi-
vidual’s conscious will, its ability to act as an agent in the political and 
legal realms—to be able to choose, to vote, to purchase economic goods—
in short, to have a conscious intentionality that can assume responsibili-
ties. To talk about the direct link between the affects and the political is to 
take us into the domain of the unconscious—in the broadest sense of that 
term—which propels us into a radically new way of conceiving of the po-
litical.
In this regard, Nietzsche perhaps went further than Spinoza in con-
ceiving of affect-politics relations. One of the primary functions of what 
we call “morality” is to establish an order or ranking among our various 
drives. “Wherever we encounter a morality,” Nietzsche says, “we also en-
counter valuations and an order of rank of human impulses… […] Now one 
and now another human impulse and state held first place and was eno-
bled because it was esteemed so highly” (Nietzsche 1974 [1882]: §116, § 
115). In a warrior morality, for instance, the affect of aggressiveness would 
be a virtue, and meekness a vice; whereas in a Christian morality, the af-
fects of meekness (turn the other cheek, do not resist) is a far higher value 
than aggression. When Nietzsche enquires into the genealogy of morality, 
he is inquiring into the conditions of any particular moral ranking of the 
impulses: why certain impulses are selected for and certain impulses are 
selected against. He famously argued that the value inherent in most 
moral rankings is the value of what he called the “herd instinct” (Ni-
etzsche 1968: 462), that is, the impulses that were selected for were those 
that tended to serve the instincts of the community, the furtherance of 
the “species” (for instance, “unegoistic” drives such as self-abnegation 
and self-sacrifice). More generally, Nietzsche argues that herd morality is 
an instinct against Life: a paradoxical situation in which Life turns against 
itself. But there is no distinction between nature and artifice here: it is not 
as if the mechanisms of morality and culture could somehow be removed, 
and the drives could exist in a “free,” “unbound,” or “liberated” state: 
there is no such thing, except perhaps as an Idea (in the Kantian sense). 
The impulse toward the herd, toward the community, is itself a drive, in 
competition with the other drives: we never leave the domain of the 
drives. 
Kant liked to say that we can never get beyond our representations; 
Nietzsche surmises that what we can never get beyond is the reality of the 
drives (Nietzsche 1966 [1886]: §36). Even when philosophers talk about 
the combat of reason against the drives—which is one of the oldest themes 
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in philosophy—we are still not leaving the domain of the drives: what we 
call “reason,” for Nietzsche, is nothing more than a certain “system of re-
lations between various passions” (Nietzsche 1967 [1901]: §387), a certain 
ordering of the drives. This is true even in Plato, for whom the “reason-
able” soul was a soul whose drives were ordered in a harmonious or “har-
monic” fashion; Nietzsche’s own criteria will be to prefer an ordering that 
emphasizes and prefers the active and productive drives. Our drives and 
impulses, in other words, are always assembled or arranged in different 
ways, in different individuals, in different moralities—which is why Ni-
etzsche always insisted that there are a plurality of moralities (Nietzsche 
1974 [1882]: §116). What he found lacking in his time was an adequate 
comparative study of moralities.
8. Deleuze and the Question of Democratic Politics
In both Nietzsche and Spinoza, then, one finds this equation of our 
affective economy with political economy, and this allows to return, fi-
nally, to our opening question, which in fact could be seen as the funda-
mental problematic of a purely immanent conception of desire: How can 
desire desire its own repression? From a theoretical viewpoint, the re-
sponse to this question has in fact already been given: if desire is already 
part of the infrastructure, if our affects and drives are in fact the working 
parts of every social assemblage, then it is inevitable that, from the start, 
our fundamental desire is for the social system of which we are a part. Our 
affects and drives are always already part of the cogs and machinery of the 
social system. It is thus not surprising that we often suffer our exploita-
tions and humiliations willingly. And this is precisely the reason that the 
political question has to be more properly posed at the level of uncon-
scious desire than at the level of preconscious interest (much less con-
scious decision). Advertisers and marketers have long ago learned this 
lesson: marketing attempts to change our affects directly, quite apart 
from our interests. It is equally a cliché to say that, in elections, people 
often vote against their interests: modern elections are fought at the level 
of desire, that is, at the level of affects and drives. Immanent desire never 
exists in a free or unbound state, but only in a machined and engineered 
assemblage, rich in interactions.
This is why Deleuze insisted, in contrast to Foucault, for instance, 
that desire is a more basic political concept than power. The fundamental 
theme of an immanent conception of desire is that “desire organizes pow-
er: it organizes the system of repression” (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 
264). To give one example: our department were recently giving oral ex-
aminations to graduate students who were taking their comprehensive 
exams. All the students were nervous; some passed, and some did not; 
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and those who did not pass felt terrible. But why did they all voluntarily 
subject themselves to this ordeal? Because in each case, their drives of the 
students were already constituted in such a way that they actually desired 
to participate in this tension-producing and ego-deflating institutional 
ritual, and not simply because they had calculated the desirability of the 
consequences of passing in terms of a calculus of utility. Their drives were 
already part of the infrastructure.
The converse problem would be: How is revolution possible?” (Pat-
ton 2000: 69; see also Sibertin-Blanc 2016: passim). Desire not only de-
sires and constructs its own repression (voluntary servitude); it is equally 
the case that the constitution of a new position of desire (or the drives)—
what Deleuze calls a “deterritorialized” desire (Deleuze and Guattari 
1983, 136)—is by its very nature a threat to any social assemblage, whose 
fundamental aim is always to code the movements of desire. The question 
of revolution (or at least social change) also has to be posed at the level of 
desire or the drives. As Paul Patton writes, “if by revolution is meant a 
rupture with the causal determinations previously at work in a given so-
cial field, then ‘only what is of the order of desire and its irruption ac-
counts for the reality this rupture assumes at a given moment, in a given 
place’” (Patton 2000: 69, citing Deleuze 1977: 377). 
This is why, finally, I would suggest that Deleuze has a fundamen-
tally ambiguous relationship to “democratic” politics—which Spinoza, for 
his part, defended quite explicitly in the Tractatus (1998). Deleuze himself 
rarely speaks of democracy, except as a particular constitution of states.7 
The problem of political organization that confronted him was derived 
directly from this immanent theory of desire: If desire is always assem-
bled by a concrete social formation, he asked, would it be possible to con-
ceive of a positive social formation that is at once external to State forma-
tion (democratic or otherwise) and, more importantly, that is actively 
constituted along a vector of “deterritorialized” desire? It was not until A 
Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 [1981]) that Deleuze was 
able to formulate a response to this question in his conception of the “no-
madic war machine” (an ambiguous name, since the social formation De-
leuze was analyzing has strictly contingent relations to both nomadism 
and war) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987 [1981]: 351-423). This raises a num-
ber of interesting questions of political organization: What is the differ-
ence between Spinoza’s radical democracy and Deleuze’s war machine? 
Why does Deleuze define the organizational principle of the war machine 
as a “numerical composition” of people? What relation, if any, would such 
a composition of people have to a democratic politics? Is it possible to 
7 For a broader analysis of Deleuze’s relationship to the question of democra-
cy, see Mengue (2003), as well as Patton’s analysis of Mengue’s book (Patton 2005; re-
printed in Patton 2010: 161–84).
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conceptualize democracy apart from the apparatus of the State? If so, is 
there a way of bringing together the Spinozistic theory of democracy with 
the Deleuzian theory of the war machine? These are questions Deleuze 
has bequeathed to future thinkers, and I myself suspect that the differ-
ences between Spinoza and Deleuze can be traced to their differing on-
tologies of immanence. Although Deleuze is, in a sense, a Spinozist, his 
own ontology could perhaps be characterized as a Spinozism minus sub-
stance, that is, as a purely modal and differential ontology. It was perhaps 
Spinoza’s retention of the theory of substance that prevented him from 
pushing his ontology of immanence to its conclusion—that is, to its De-
leuzian conclusion. Whatever their differences, what Spinoza and Deleuze 
agree on is the intimate link between ontology and politics, as opposed to 
any political theory that would grounds its ethical principles in a domain 
outside ontology, which is precisely the political position of transcen-
dence.
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